Threat Scenario | Protection Mechanism |
---|---|
Disk theft | AES-256-GCM encryption at rest |
Network interception | TLS + AEAD encryption in transit |
Server compromise | In-use encryption prevents extraction of plaintext embeddings or node keys |
Index leakage | Forward privacy hides relationship between new inserts and past searches |
Embedding inversion | Ciphertext embeddings are never exposed — inversion is not possible without keys |
Property | Implementation | Benefit |
---|---|---|
Query Privacy | Token-scoped key derivation | Server never sees full index keys |
Result Confidentiality | End-to-end encryption | Plaintext results never leave client |
Forward Security | Counter-based key evolution | Past compromises don’t affect future queries |
Index Obfuscation | Ciphertext-only storage | Unused index nodes remain opaque |
Correlation Resistance | Per-insertion randomization | Identical vectors produce different ciphertexts |
>10,000 QPS at 95% recall for ANN search over encrypted embeddings
Sub-10ms query latency for typical workloads